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ASSISTED SUICIDE AND DISABLED PEOPLE
Stephen L. Mikochik*
A theme of this Symposium is to address current issues left open by
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). It is thus appropriate
that one of the papers presented should treat the question of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. That question involves quality-of-life considera-
tions of peculiar concern to people, like myself, with disabilities. The
issue is current-the United States Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ment in Washington v. Glucksberg, ("Compassion in Dying")' and
Vacco v. Quill2 ("Quill") on January 8, 1997.
In Compassion in Dying, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the
Ninth Circuit en banc, invalidated Washington's ban on assisted sui-
cide as being outweighed by a supposed right to die of terminally ill
individuals. 3 Though rejecting such a right, Judge Roger Miner, writ-
ing for a panel of the Second Circuit in Quill, nonetheless, found that
New York's distinction permitting withdrawal of life support but for-
bidding assisted suicide for the terminally ill lacked a rational basis
and thus violated equal protection.4
The ADA does not treat the subject expressly. At first glance, sec-
tion 501(d)-which protects disabled persons' rights to decline any
proffered "accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit" 5-
might seem to support the right to forgo suicide prevention services
and to choose physician-assisted death. Nevertheless, the Justice De-
partment's authoritative regulatory gloss concluded that "medical
treatment, including treatment for particular conditions, [presumably,
* B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.RS. Professor, Temple University School of Law. I appreciate the
invaluable assistance in preparing this paper provided by Alan Preti and Melissa Clarke.
This Article is based on a presentation given on January 31, 1997 at DePaul Law Review's
Symposium entitled Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
1. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd on reh'g, 79
F.3d 790 (1996), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
2. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
3. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838.
4. Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 501(d), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(d) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation,
aid, service, opportunity, or benefit which such individual chooses not to accept.").
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encompassing such services as the prescription of lethal medication] is
not a special accommodation or service for individuals with disabilities
under section 501(d)" 6-thus, rendering that section inapposite to the
question of physician-assisted suicide.7 Accordingly, I will proceed to
analyze the soundness of the Ninth and Second Circuit decisions.8
The state of Washington made it a felony for anyone knowingly to
aid another's attempt to commit suicide.9 Writing for the Ninth Cir-
cuit en banc, Judge Reinhardt invalidated this provision as violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 He rea-
soned that the claim for physician-assisted suicide, that the statute
would bar, could only be judged in relation to the end for which such
6. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commer-
cial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 613 (1996); cf. id. § 36.203(c)(2) ("Nothing in the Act or
this part authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline
food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual.").
7. This is not to say that the ADA is wholly irrelevant to the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide. If states permit terminally ill patients to seek their physicians' assistance in dying, that
would clearly not be a policy modification required for their equal access to existing suicide
prevention services. Neither might it be a permitted special benefit since it arguably rests on the
assumption that such patients' lives are not worth saving. Cf. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429
(D. Or. 1995) (invalidating Oregon's Death with Dignity Act under the Equal Protection Clause
but not reaching the plaintiffs' ADA claim). As the House Judiciary Committee reported when
considering section 501(d): "[N]othing in the ADA is intended to permit discriminatory treat-
ment on the basis of disability, even when such treatment is rendered under the guise of provid-
ing an accommodation, service, aid or benefit to the individual with disability." H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 3, at 71-72 (1990).
It is to say, however, that, since the ADA does not directly address the issue of physician-
assisted suicide, then, if the Supreme Court reverses the Second and Ninth Circuits in part be-
cause some Justices believe the states should more thoroughly address the subject before an
approach is constitutionalized, it is unlikely that courts would use the Act to preclude such ef-
forts, at least in the absence of an authoritative Justice Department application. See Excerpts
from the Supreme Court Arguments on Physician-Assisted Suicide, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at
A16 ("[T]hat might be a ... perfectly legitimate argument for saying that ... the court should
wait until it can know more ... before it passes ultimate judgment."). Of course, if the Supreme
Court affirms the decisions in Compassion in Dying and Quill, the ADA issue is likely moot.
8. I have found the following definition of "euthanasia" helpful: "an action or an omission
which of itself or by intention causes [another's] death, in order that all suffering may in this way
be eliminated." CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHA-
NASIA II, reprinted in 10 ORIGINS 154, 155 (Aug. 14, 1980). Thus, euthanasia can be active or
passive, and voluntary, nonvoluntary, or involuntary on the part of the patient. In contrast,
"assisted suicide" is where patients directly cause their own death but with assistance-as when
their physicians prescribe for them lethal medication. Admittedly, the lines seem to blur when,
for instance, a physician removes life-support at a competent patient's direction. However, this
also illustrates the difficulties in holding the line against euthanasia that would arise, once physi-
cian-assisted suicide was sanctioned.
9. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794 (1996) ("A person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt sui-
cide.") (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1991)).
10. Id. at 838.
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assistance would serve as a means." Characterizing that end as "sui-
cide," he thought, was too narrow since the goal should encompass
other forms of consensual life terminations, including the declination
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, which he believed the law
did not consider suicide today.' 2 Judge Reinhardt settled on labeling
the end, and the corresponding claimed constitutional right, as "con-
trolling the time and manner of one's death," "hastening one's death,"
and, most broadly, as "the right to die.' 3
By this technique, Judge Reinhardt attempted to strengthen the
claim for physician-assisted suicide by increasing its level of general-
ity, something like when specific governmental activities are linked to
the national security as a means of heightening their importance. The
legitimacy of this approach, of course, depends on whether assisting
suicide and declining treatment are sufficiently similar to justify cate-
gorizing them together. Before discussing that point, however, I will
first address Judge Reinhardt's claimed "right to die" directly.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from denying life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.14 As a textual matter,
it seems contradictory to construe a provision protecting life to in-
clude a right to make oneself dead. Of course, Judge Reinhardt's fo-
cus was not on "life" in the Fourteenth Amendment but on its
protection of "liberty," arguing that it should include at least the ter-
minally ill person's right to choose death.' 5 Logically, however, lib-
erty presupposes life itself since there can be no liberty without life.
Death, as Justice Brennan plainly observed, forecloses the very right
to have rights themselves.' 6 Thus, liberty and a right to die seem mu-
tually exclusive.
Moreover, a right to die could sweep within its sanction all consen-
sual acts as of lesser harm to the individual than death-thus, constitu-
tionalizing John Stuart Mill's notable principle:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised commu-
11. Id. at 801.
12. See id. at 802.
13. Id.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.
16. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289-90 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 17
Rejecting claims that consensual acts were per force protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment,18 the Supreme Court has instead followed
the course that Justice Harlan approved in Griswold v. Connecticut:1 9
[S]ociety is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being
of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the
moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line be-
tween public behavior and that which is purely consensual or soli-
tary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it nec-
essary to deal.20
Undoubtedly, certain consensual acts have been placed under due
process protection. Judge Reinhardt would add the right to die to that
list, despite its excessive breadth, because it fell within the language in
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey2 1-language that he believed, fashioned criteria for designating
what matters warranted protection.22 After listing certain nontextual
rights that the Supreme Court had previously recognized-including
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education" 23-Justice O'Connor stated in Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.24
Few would quibble that "personal dignity and autonomy" are not
"central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
However, these terms are not self-defining. "Personal" and "inti-
mate" are adjectives too subjective and malleable to provide any
17. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.
1956) (1859).
18. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (engaging in homosexual sod-
omy); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973) (viewing obscene motion
pictures).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (incorporated by refer-
ence in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500).
21. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (1996) (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
22. See id.
23. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
24. Id.
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greater precision. In fact, Justice O'Connor relied on "reasoned judg-
ment" as her standard,25 as it was elucidated by Justice Harlan in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut:
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions [due process] has represented the balance which our Na-
tion, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individ-
ual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.... The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by
this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a deci-
sion which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. 26
Since Griswold, the Court has affirmed the primary role of tradition in
identifying nontextual rights, characterizing them as those liberties
that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 2 7
Whatever deficiencies the claimed abortion right might have in this
regard, Justice O'Connor chose to discount this right in favor of the
concerns that informed stare decisis,2 8 concerns not present when the
issue is the right to die.
Our tradition provides scant support for a right to die, as it applies
to suicide or aid to that end. At common law, suicide was a crime:29
Although the States abolished the penalties imposed by the com-
mon law (i.e., forfeiture and ignominious burial), they did so to
spare the innocent family and not to legitimize the act. Case law at
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment generally
held that assisting suicide was a criminal offense .... And most
States that did not explicitly prohibit assisted suicide in 1868 recog-
nized, when the issue arose in the 50 years following the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification, that assisted and (in some cases) at-
tempted suicide were unlawful. 30
25. See id. at 849.
26. Id. at 850 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality)); cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (stating
that due process protects only those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
28. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 ("While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on
behalf of the State in the cases before us, arguments which in their ultimate formulation con-
clude that Roe should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the cen-
tral holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis.").
29. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 189).
30. Id. at 294-95 (citing Thomas Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duo. L.
REV. 1, 76-100, 148-242 (1985)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Today, Oregon, alone of the fifty states, sanctions assisted suicide.31
As an influential study of legal constraints on suicide concluded,
"there is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is
so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 32
In Glucksberg, Judge Reinhardt discounted the role of tradition as a
static adherence to the past33-thus, mistakenly confusing it with an
exclusive reliance on original intent.34 Tradition, however, as Justice
Harlan observed, is "a living thing" 35 -not confined merely to what
the framers intended but augmented by the evolving maturation of a
people.
Nor should public opinion trump long-standing tradition, as Judge
Reinhardt implied, 36 since constitutional strictures require more sta-
bility than shifting opinion polls provide and a prudence that comes
only with the test of time. Ultimately, a constitutionalism that relies
on current trends denies the basic need of society for continuity as
well as for change.
However, even if current trends are proper guides for the Court as
well as for Congress, it is notable that, "[s]ince 1994, at least seventeen
states have rejected legislative proposals to legalize assisted suicide. ' 37
Moreover, well-publicized referenda in both Washington and Califor-
nia that would have weakened state laws against assisted suicide were
recently defeated. 38
Judge Reinhardt further reasoned that, whether one died from re-
jecting life support or from ingesting lethal medication, the end was
31. But see Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (enjoining Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act on equal protection grounds).
32. Marzen et al., supra note 30, at 100 (internal quotations omitted) (quoted in Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
33. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1996).
34. At bottom, a narrow reliance on original intent denies that the People can manifest their
will-not just expressly, as through the amendment process, but also through actions, when re-
peated to form customs or tradition. As St. Thomas Aquinas observed centuries ago, "when a
thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason." ST.
THOMAS AoUrNAs, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, la-Ilae (First Part, Part II), Q. 97, A.3, 80 (Fa-
thers of the Dominican Province trans., Bums Oates & Washourne Ltd. 1927).
35. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (incorporated by reference in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965)).
36. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
37. United States Supreme Court Brief of United States Catholic Conference et al., as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash,.
1994), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110), available in 1996 WL 650919, at *8 n.1.
38. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
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the same,39 and, thus, a right to die had implicitly been accepted by
the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.40 Similarly, though rejecting such a right,4 ' Judge Miner in
Quill nonetheless concurred that an action-omission distinction, be-
tween administering deadly drugs and withholding life support, was
untenable after Cruzan since, in both instances, the objective was
death.42
The question before the Cruzan Court, however, was "simply and
starkly" whether states could require clear and convincing evidence of
incompetent patients' wishes before permitting removal of life sup-
port and not whether due process protected some right to die.43 In
deciding that issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, as-
sumed, without deciding, that such patients had a liberty interest in
refusing lifesaving hydration and nutrition.44 While Justice O'Connor,
who joined the five-Justice majority opinion and filed a separate con-
currence, would have embraced that interest expressly,45 it was clear
that the focus for both Justices was on the patient's right to reject
forced, invasive, or burdensome treatment and not on some right to
choose death.46
This distinction was well put by the New York State Governor's
Task Force on Life and the Law in 1994:
[T]he fact that the refusal of treatment and suicide may both lead to
death does not mean that they implicate identical constitutional
concerns. The imposition of life-sustaining medical treatment
against a patient's will requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity
and, in some cases, the use of physical restraints, both of which are
flatly inconsistent with society's basic conception of personal dig-
nity .... It is this right against intrusion-not a general right to
control the timing and manner of death-that forms the basis of the
39. See id. at 824 ("[W]e see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a
doctor's pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs which will permit a terminally
ill patient to end his own life .... To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient is the
intended result as surely in one case as in the other.").
40. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1996).
42. See id. at 729.
43. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
44. See id. at 279.
45. See id. at 287.
46. See id. at 278-79 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see id. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In that regard, Justice O'Connor emphasized that many patients needed to be restrained forcibly
from removing nasal feeding tubes, d. (referring to David Major, The Medical Procedures for
Providing Food and Water: Indications and Effects, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE
CHOICE To FORGO LnE-SusTAINING FOOD AND WATER 25 (Joanne Lynn, M.D. ed., 1986)),
while other techniques for providing food and fluids required surgical implantation), see id. at
289.
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constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Restrictions
on suicide, by contrast, entail no such intrusions, but simply prevent
individuals from intervening in the natural process of dying.47
Moreover, if a right to die were recognized, it could not be cabined to
the terminally ill. Attempts to define "terminally ill" have elsewhere
proven difficult. For example, time restrictions, such as death within
six months, are problematic since predictions about the duration of a
terminal condition are merely estimates. 48 As the ABA Commission
on Legal Problems of the Elderly concluded in 1992, "seventeen years
of experience with State Living Will statutes that have used 'terminal
condition' as a prerequisite to patient directives have demonstrated
that 'terminal' lacks any truly objective, operational definition. '49
Even assuming a manageable definition were possible, however,
"[t]he attempt to restrict such [right] to the terminally ill is illusory." 50
47. Brief of United States Catholic Conference et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL 656248, at *11
(citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS Souorr: As-
SISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 71 (1994)). Admittedly, this dis-
tinction fails where the choice is to reject artificial feeding for permanently unconscious
patients-for whom such treatment is likely not burdensome, is beneficial in sustaining life, and
where, if such treatment were denied, the resulting starvation and dehydration, and not the un-
derlying pathology, would be the cause of death. Rather than have such exceptional cases nullify
a distinction that makes sense where treatment is actually burdensome, and that has a long
lineage in the law, the Supreme Court, when the issue is presented directly, should reject the
right assumed in Cruzan to withdraw food and fluids for those in persistent vegetative states. If
states continued to license such withdrawal, however, then the states could still rationally distin-
guish assisted suicide, as posing a broader threat to their interest in preventing abuse, and the
consequences of erroneous diagnosis than would permission limited to those patients already on
life support. In any event, as Judge Noonan observed for the original Ninth Circuit panel in
Compassion in Dying that Judge Reinhardt later reversed:
[T]he far more relevant part of the opinion in Cruzan [was the Court's confirmation]
that "there can be no gainsaying" a state's interest "in the protection and preservation
of human life" and, as evidence of that legitimate concern, . . . [that] "the majority of
States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another
to commit suicide."
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 280).
48. Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 349, 357-58 (1996) (prepared
testimony of Leon R. Kass, M.D.) [hereinafter Assisted Suicide Hearing]. Judge Reinhardt fa-
vorably cited the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, under which a "terminal illness" is a
medical condition that is "incurable and irreversible, that is, without administering life-sustaining
treatment the condition, will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death in a rela-
tively short time." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 831 n.117 (9th Cir. 1996).
Under this approach, diabetics would be terminally ill since, without administration of insulin,
they would die in a relatively short time.
49. ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Memorandum in Opposition to Res-
olution No. 8 on Voluntary Aid in Dying, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 117, 120 (1992) [hereinafter ABA
Memorandum].
50. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591.
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As Judge Noonan wrote for the original Ninth Circuit panel in Com-
passion in Dying that Judge Reinhardt later reversed:
The category created is inherently unstable. The depressed twenty-
one year old, the romantically-devastated twenty-eight year old, the
alcoholic forty-year old who choose suicide are also expressing their
views of existence, meaning, the universe, and life; they are also as-
serting their personal liberty. If at the heart of the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to be-
lieve and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to sui-
cide and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at
least every sane adult.51
Language in Judge Reinhardt's opinion intensifies the concern that a
right to die would extend beyond those terminally ill. He wrote, for
example, that the recognition of that right was "strongly influenced
by, but not limited to, the plight of mentally competent, terminally ill
adults ... as well [as] by the plight of others, such as those whose
existence is reduced to a vegetative state or a permanent and irrevers-
ible state of unconsciousness. '52 He further explained that terminally
ill patients should have the right to choose death because their "pain
: . . [and] suffering ... is too intimate and personal for the State to
insist on,"'53 because they "cannot be cured," 54 and because they "can
only be maintained in a debilitated and deteriorating state, unable to
enjoy the presence of family or friends" 55-clearly, considerations not
limited to the terminally ill alone.
In addition, since Judge Reinhardt thought it "less important who
administer[ed] the medication than who determine[ed] whether the
terminally ill person's life shall end,"' 56 the difference between assisted
suicide and active euthanasia evidently carried little weight for him.
Although he considered "the critical line in right-to-die cases as the
one between the voluntary and involuntary termination of an individ-
ual's life,"'57 he would not limit the prerogative to competent patients
since, as he made clear, "a decision of a duly appointed surrogate de-
cision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient
himself."58
Such prospects for expansion are not academic but have occurred
over the past two decades in the Netherlands. Beginning with legal
51. Id. at 590-91.
52. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
53. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 821.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 832.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 832 n.120.
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acquiescence in physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill
patients,59 the Dutch have moved to permitting an estimated 2.9% of
all deaths per year from active euthanasia. 60 Moreover, the Dutch
government reported approximately one thousand cases of
nonvoluntary euthanasia in 1990.61 Assisted suicide or euthanasia are
now accepted for both quadriplegic 62 and severely depressed per-
sons63 with no terminal condition at all. As Dr. Herbert Hendin of the
American Suicide Foundation summarized for the House Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution:
Over the past two decades, the Netherlands has moved from as-
sisted suicide to euthanasia, from euthanasia for the terminally ill to
euthanasia for the chronically ill, from euthanasia for physical ill-
ness to euthanasia for psychological distress and from voluntary eu-
thanasia to nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Once the
Dutch accepted assisted suicide it was not possible legally or mor-
ally to deny more active medical help i.e. euthanasia to those who
could not affect their own deaths. Nor could they deny assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia to the chronically ill who have longer to suffer
than the terminally ill or to those who have psychological pain not
associated with physical disease. To do so would be a form of
discrimination. 64
59. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against Permitting
Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions", 11 ISSUES L. &
MED. 239, 248 (1995); Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch
Cure, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 123, 134-35 (1994).
60. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 49, at 119. Based on published Dutch government
statistics, one influential observer estimates that up to 7% of all deaths in the Netherlands results
from euthanasia: "In the U.S., these numbers would mean a rate of euthanasia resulting in
140,000 deaths per year as the direct and intentional result of physician intervention." Carlos F.
Gomez, Euthanasia: Consider the Dutch, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 1992, at 7 (Special Supp.).
61. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 49, at 119 ("[A]lthough the required conditions for
euthanasia in the Netherlands include explicit and repeated requests by the patient for euthana-
sia, a recent Dutch government study estimates that .8% (or 1,030 deaths) of life-terminating
acts in 1990 were done without explicit and persistent requests."). This number increases signifi-
cantly if deaths from the intentionally lethal administration of morphine by physicians (which
the Dutch do not count as euthanasia) are included. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 59, at 268
n.41; see also Brief of United States Catholic Health Ass'n, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-
1858) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. 117 S.
Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110), available in 1996 WL 656343.
62. See Richard Doerflinger, Assisted Suicide: Pro-choice or Anti-Life?, 19 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 16, 18 (Jan.-Feb. 1989) (Special Supp.).
63. See Hendin, supra note 59, at 123.
64. Assisted Suicide Hearing, supra note 48, at 127-38 (prepared testimony of Herbert Hendin,
M.D.). Though the Dutch experience should not be uncritically applied, it is noteworthy that,
"[u]nlike the United States, virtually all [Dutch] citizens have access to primary health care."
ABA Memorandum, supra note 49, at 119. This expansion thus occurred in a society where the
cost-cutting pressures our country is now experiencing are not present.
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Notably, a comparable expansion has occurred in cases in the United
States affirming a right to refuse life support: beginning with a right of
competent terminally ill patients; 65 to a right of competent, severely
disabled, but not terminally ill persons;66 to a right of incompetent
patients, with or without clear and convincing evidence of their prior
wishes;67 to the right of a person who had never been competent;6
and even to a case involving a minor. 69 Assisted suicide, once sanc-
tioned, could likewise expand since, as Justice Cardozo cautioned, any
principle tends "to expand itself to the limit of its logic."'70
Given his observation that the Supreme Court had "expressed a
strong reluctance to find new fundamental rights," 71 Judge Reinhardt
instead labeled the right to die a "liberty interest" which, though not
warranting strict scrutiny, was nonetheless "subject to a balancing
test" to be weighed against competing government interests. 72 In
striking that balance, he deliberately discounted the state's interest in
the preservation of life by the quality of the life involved. As he
65. See Brief of Gary Lee, M.D., et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington
v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-
110) and Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-
1858), available in 1996 WL 647921, at *25 (citing Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602
F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that "competent adult patients with terminal illnesses have
a right to determine for themselves whether or not they wish their lives to be prolonged by
artificial life support systems")).
66. Id. at *25-26 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986) (holding that
"no compelling state interest in the preservation of human life exists that would outweigh a
competent but disabled person's right to terminate treatment because 'the quality of her life has
been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration'") and
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (1990) (ratifying "the right to die for competent persons with
disabilities who were dependent on life-sustaining treatment in order to live," e.g. those having
an "artificial survival" or lives "'irreparably devastated by injury or illness"')).
67. Id. at *26-27 (citing Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986)
(holding that "casual remarks made by a patient prior to the onset of any illness could be suffi-
cient evidence to find that the now incompetent patient would, if competent, decline to receive
nutrition and hydration by tube"), Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (upholding state requirement that wishes prior to vegetative-state be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, but not requiring same standard for all states), and In re Jobes, 529 A.2d
434 (1987) (holding that surrogate decision maker "may withhold feeding by tube even when the
incompetent patient has not left clear and convincing evidence of her intent")).
68. Id. at *28 (citing In re Sue Ann Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (1991) (holding that Indiana
Health Care Act "permits families to decide, in consultation with a physician, to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment ... from never-competent patients in persistent vegetative state")).
69. Id. (citing In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (1990) (holding that "pre-accident declarations made
by a minor later left in a persistent vegetative state ... may be found sufficient to satisfy a
determination that clear and convincing evidence exists of the minor's decision to discontinue
life-sustaining treatment and feeding tubes")).
70. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 51 (1949).
71. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 804.
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wrote: The state's interest in preserving life "is not ... of the same
strength in each case. To the contrary, its strength is dependent on
relevant circumstances, including the medical condition and the
wishes of the person whose life is at stake. '73
Although Judge Reinhardt stated that "the state may still seek to
prolong the lives of terminally ill or comatose patients," he, nonethe-
less, concluded that "the strength of the state's interest is substantially
reduced in such circumstances. '74
Judge Miner also rested his decision squarely on quality-of-life con-
siderations-but in the context, not of due process, but of equal pro-
tection. Unlike Judge Reinhardt, he declined to find a right to die but
purported to apply rational basis scrutiny to New York's distinction
between denying terminally ill patients assisted suicide and permitting
their refusal of life support. 75 That standard is satisfied "if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify [the distinction.]" 76 How-
ever, Judge Miner found a rational basis wholly lacking. As he main-
tained: "[W]hat interest can the state possibly have in requiring the
prolongation of a life that is all but ended? Surely, the state's interest
lessens as the potential for life diminishes .... The greatly reduced
interest of the state in preserving life compels the answer to these
questions: 'None.' ,,77
However, if the state has no rational interest in preserving such di-
minished life, then Judge Miner's reasoning would equally justify in-
voluntary euthanasia.
Simply put, both Judges Reinhardt and Miner are saying that there
are lives which the state has little or no interest in saving. I can think
of no more profound rejection of the purpose animating the Four-
teenth Amendment itself. Due process and equal protection, though
not coextensive, 78 coalesce in forbidding the state from denying the
equal dignity of the human person. This does not mean that states
73. Id. at 817.
74. Id. at 820. Notably, Cruzan provides no support for this strategy, since, as Judge Rein-
hardt himself admitted, "[that] Court explicitly did not decide-when, whether, and under what
circumstances Nancy Cruzan's exercise of a liberty interest could be prohibited by the state." Id.
at 815 n.68.
75. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727 (1996).
76. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). For example, reducing the chance of
misdiagnosing terminal conditions by limiting the choice to those already on life support should
constitute such a rational distinction.
77. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-30.
78. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("The 'equal protection of the laws' is a
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do
not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.").
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must treat all equally in every respect. 79 Nor does it mean that what
constitutes dignity is static-the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance,
recognized that dignity required more than just the prohibition of
slavery.80 But central to that dignity guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is respect for life-without which there can be no liberty,
no pursuit of happiness, and even no humanity itself. Since we all
have an equal claim to dignity by virtue of the fact that we are all
created human, the state must respect each of our lives equally.
It is said, in response, that we can alienate that right-that we can
consent to end an existence that, fundamentally, we cannot create.
However, equal respect for life would require, at the least, that states
respect that choice equally. If so, then, as Judge Noonan observed,
"the right to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are the pre-
rogative of at least every sane adult .... The conclusion is a reductio
ad absurdum.' '81
Such quality-of-life considerations are particularly ominous for peo-
ple with disabilities. One need not dwell on the euthanasia program
in Nazi Germany, where a quarter of a million people were slaugh-
tered in medical killing centers as "useless eaters,"82 to know that
those with disabilities have suffered much during this century. In this
79. I will not discuss here whether one can forfeit this guarantee as a consequence of
aggression.
80. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872)
These circumstances [where newly emancipated slaves were denied contract, property,
and other rights in the post-bellum South] . . . forced upon the statesmen who had
conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the rebellion, and who
supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of
their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitu-
tional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They accordingly
passed ... the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
81. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995).
82. See generally HUGH G. GALLAGHER, By TRUST BETRAYED: PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND
THE LICENSE To KILL IN THE TmRD REICH (1990). As Leo Alexander, chief medical consultant
at Nuremberg, observed of the Nazi atrocities:
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all who inves-
tigated them that they had started from small beginnings,... at first merely a subtle
shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of physicians. It started with the acceptance of
the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as a life not
worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the
severely and chronically sick. Gradually, the sphere of those to be included in this
category was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically un-
wanted, the racially unwanted and finally all non-Aryans. But it is important to realize
that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received
its impetus was the attitude toward the non-rehabilitable sick.
Joan R. Bullock, Abortion Rights in America, 1994 BYU L. REV. 63, 70 n.30 (1994) (quoting Leo
Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39, 44 (1949)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
country, for example, as Justice Marshall observed, retarded people
were "subject to a 'lengthy and tragic history' . . . of segregation and
discrimination that can only be called grotesque.... [This] regime...
in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst
excesses of Jim Crow."' 83 Justice Holmes perhaps best exemplified
this attitude when he sanctioned the forced sterilization of Carrie
Buck:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.84
As a Chicago ordinance once evidenced when it forbade those "dis-
eased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed so as to be an un-
sightly or disgusting object ... [from exposing themselves] to public
view,"85 we disabled are a distressing reminder to able-bodied people
of their own frailty.86
These fears are epitomized by the way our society interprets a seri-
ously disabled person's desire to die: "When the nondisabled say they
want to die, they are labeled as suicidal; if they are disabled, it is
treated as 'natural' or 'reasonable."' 87 As Carol Gill has observed:
[The nondisabled public] readily conclude[s] that the disabled per-
son's wish to die is reasonable because it agrees with their own pre-
conception that the primary problem for such individuals is the
unbearable experience of a permanent disability (and/or depen-
dence on life-aids) [rather than treatable conditions, often including
depression occasioned by social prejudice]. If permanent disability
is the problem, death is the solution.88
83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citation omitted).
85. Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 IssuEs L. &
MED. 141, 144 (1987) (quoting F. BowE, HANDICAPPING AMEICA 186 (1978)).
86. As Congress has found, pervasive discrimination against disabled people persists today.
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3) (1994).
87. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).
88. Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8
IssuEs L. & MED. 37, 39 (1996). Gill resists this conclusion, asserting:
Disability is no more a sufficient or acceptable reason for wanting to die than romantic
failure would be for an adolescent... [l]f important people in the environment address
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Such depreciation of disabled life is accelerated by our fixation with
efficiency. As John Paul II has admonished, "prosperous societies,
marked by an attitude of excessive preoccupation with efficiency [see]
.. elderly and disabled people as intolerable and too burdensome." 89
In other words, for societies, like ours, "organized almost exclusively
on the basis of criteria of productive efficiency,. .. [a life with disabil-
ity] no longer has any value." 90
Such criteria would undoubtedly confirm the reasonableness of a
severely disabled person's choice to die-especially, "[i]n this age of
soaring health care costs,... [where] the right-to-die option will inevi-
tably be transformed into a means of rationing health care." 91 More-
over, "once the choice of a quick and painless death is officially
accepted as rational," it follows that "resistance to this choice may be
seen as eccentric or even selfish." 92
Judge Reinhardt claimed in response that disabled persons' dignity
would be vindicated by recognizing their equal right to make them-
selves dead.93 On a par with the Lochner Court's contention that fair
labor laws denied workers their freedom of contract,94 this claim mer-
its the exercise, in reply, of "one of the sovereign prerogatives of phi-
losophers-that of laughter. '95
More generally, Judge Reinhardt dismissed concerns about the
consequences of legalizing assisted suicide by noting that
"[r]ecognition of any right creates the possibility of abuse. ' 96 He con-
tended, for example: "The legalization of abortion has not under-
mined our commitment to life generally[;] ... [s]imilarly, there is no
reason to believe that legalizing assisted suicide will lead to the hor-
rific consequences its opponents suggest. '97
Of course, there are those, like myself, who believe that the push
for assisted suicide illustrates just how Roe v. Wade98 has undermined
... [the] sense of hopelessness, rather than acquiesce to it, the individual has a fighting
chance of mastering despair.
Id. at 50.
89. POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE, EVANGELIUM VITAE, reprinted in 24 ORIGINS
689, 712 (April 6, 1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
90. Id.
91. Evan Kemp, Jr., Could You Please Die Now? Disabled People Like Me Have Good Rea-
son To Fear the Push for Assisted Suicide, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1997, at Cl.
92. Doerflinger, supra note 62, at 17 (footnote omitted).
93. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 825 (9th Cir. 1996).
94. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
95. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424
(1960).
96. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831.
97. Id.
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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that commitment to life. Once we exclude some human lives from
legal protection, it is not hard to make other exceptions, especially for
lives we consider dependent.99
I would prefer in the end to align myself with Joseph Cardinal Ber-
nardin who, in an open letter to the Supreme Court last November
just before his death from cancer, wrote that "creating a [new] right to
assisted suicide 'would endanger society and send a false signal that a
less than "perfect" life is not worth living." ' 100 He closed with this
warning: "In civilized society the law exists to protect life. When it
begins to legitimate the taking of life as a policy, one has a right to ask
what lies ahead for our life together as a society." 10'
Etymologically, the term "compassion" means to "suffer with."'102
"True 'compassion' leads to sharing another's pain; it does not kill the
person whose suffering we cannot bear."'10 3
99. See Stephen L. Mikochik, The Truth of Equality, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 14. That article
states:
Roe conditioned human worth on viability, on reaching that stage of development be-
yond an intrinsic dependence on another. Yet, in saying human worth transcends disa-
bility, we acknowledge that it does not hang on how far we have developed or on how
dependent we remain.
We are equal because we are all created human, and endowed with the inalienable
right to pursue realization of our human potential. Though that potential may develop
in radically different ways, we are all intrinsically dependent on one another for its
growth.
Id.
100. Jan C. Greenburg, Affirm Life, Not Suicide, Bernardin Tells Justices, CHI. TRB., Nov. 12,
1996, at N1 (quoting Cardinal Bernardin's letter to the United States Supreme Court on the
issue of assisted suicide).
101. Id.
102. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 462 (1981).
103. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 89, at 713.
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